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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

MARVIN W. HANSEN AND BEVERLY
M. HANSEN
Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs.
REUEL S. KOHLER AND DOLORES M.
KOHLER, his wife
Case No. 14099
Defendants and Respondents
EARSEL G. PIERCE AND PATRICIA
B. PIERCE, his wife
Intervening Defendants
and Cross Claimants
. - - - - • - -

000O000

- - - - - -

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This case has two parts. The first part involves a house on
2.36 acres located in Howell, Box Elder County, Utah, which was
owned by the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs traded the property as
a down payment upon the Robinson property located in Salt Lake
County, a four-plex.

The agreed value of the property in Howell

was $7,500.00. The Hcwell property was deeded to Reuel S. Kohler
the real estate agent, and his wife, at the request of the Robinsons,

the owner of the four-plex because of a deal involving the Kohlers
and Robinsons,
All of the papers pertaining to the four-plex and the Howell
property were prepared and left with Mr. Kohler to be held by him,
the real estate agent, until the deal was consummated.

It devel-

oped that the house and lot had been included in a mortgage upon
Mr, Hansen's farm at Howell, so Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hansen
entered into a new agreement by the terms of which Hansens conveyed
to Robinsons a Thunderbird automobile and made a payment as provided
by the contract in advance ajad agreed to pay the Kohlers' commission
and that Mr. Kohler was to hold the Howell property as security, for
his commission.
The second part of the case involves the Pierces who purchased
the Howell property from the Kohlers and the Deed from Kohlers to
Pierces was put on record the day before the Lis Pendens was filed
against the Kohlers.

The Pierces appeared and requested permission

to be made Intervening Defendants and Cross Claimants at the time of
the pre-trial, claiming damages because of the filing of the Lis Pendens.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court found in favor of the Defendant, Kohler, and against
the Plaintiff, no cause of action (R. 490-491)
The Court awarded damages in favor of the Pierces and against the
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Plaintiff in the sum of $4,166.05 plus interest and costs. (R. 464)
That on a Motion for a New Trial, (R. 467-468), the amount was
reduced by $1,500.00, making a new Judgment of $2,596.75. (R. 499).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs ask for reversal of the Judgment in favor of Kohlers
and against Plaintiffs, Hansens.
That the Judgment in favor of the Intervening Defendants, Pierces,
be reversed and their Counterclaim be dismissed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I am dividing the Statement of Facts into two portions. The
first one pertaining to the deals between Hansen and Kohler as to
the Howell property and the second part is the claim for damages of
Pierces against the Hansens for filing a Lis Pendesn.
Marvin W. Hansen, Plaintiff, owned the property at Howell, Utah
worth $7,500.00, which was the agreed sales price. Mr. Kohler, a
real estate agent, had a listing on a four-plex in Salt Lake County
owned by Mr. Kent Robinson. Negotiations were carried on and an
Earnest Money Agreement was entered into between Mr. Hansen and Mr.
Robinson, (Exhibit 1, R. 9-10).
By the terms of the Earnest Money Receipt, the four-plex was
to be conveyed to Marvin W. Hansen by Kent Robinson and Kent Robinson
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was to pay the commission to Mr. Kohler of 6 percent on $39f400.00,
total purchase

price as provided in the Earnest Money Receipt,

(Exhibit lf R. 9-10), amounting to $2,364.00. The down payment
was $7,500.00, which was the agreed value of the land and home
belonging to the Hansens at Howell, Utah. Hansens also agreed to
pay on Robinsons' equity at the rate of $310.00 per month with
a balloon payment of $2,000.00 on May 15, 1969.
That thereafter on April 1, 1969, a Uniform Real Estate
Contract, (Exhibit 2), was entered into and two Deeds were made
out at the request of Robinson to and in the name of Reuel S. Kohler
and his wife and delivered to Mr. Kohler as the closing agent and
real estate agent of the parties. (Exhibit 3 and 4).

A closing

statement was given to the seller and the buyer and on the Hansens
closing statement, they were given credit for $7,500.00 for the
Howell Property, (Exhibit 5), the contract being in accordance with
the Earnest Money Receipt.
There was a side deal between Mr. Kohler and Mr. Robinson, by
the terms of which Mr. Kohler was to receive the Howell property as
part payment of his commission and in addition thereto, Mr. Kohler
was to pay to Mr. Robinson, $2,000.00, for the Howell property. (R.5),
and that was why the Deed was made out from the Hansens to Kohlers.
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It developed that the house and the 2.36 acres was included
in a mortgage on the 450 acre farm owned by Mr. Hansen. When Mr.
Robinson and Mr. Hansen found out about the mortagage, they signed
a memorandum that inasmuch as the lien could not be cleared at that
time, the Hansens authorized the advance of $1,000.00 of the
$2,000.00 balloon payment of the 15th day of May, to be paid to
Robinson to show his good faith.
Mr. Robinson proposed to take an automobile owned by Mr. Hansen
a new Ford Thunderbird, (R. 13 and 14), valued at $5,000.00 to $5,300.00
(R. 28-29).

Mr. Robinson proposed to Mr. Hansen that he give him

the Thunderbird and pay the sales commission to Mr. Kohler in place
of the Howell property (R. 13, 27-37), and that Mr. Hansen could
pay Mr. Kohler the sales commission at a later date and that there
would be $1,000.00 of the $2,000.00 balloon payment paid immediately
to Mr. Robinson.

That Mr. Robinson was to take the Hansen car and

shop it to see what it was worth.

Mr. Robinson proposed to take

the car, Mr. Hansen was to assume the commission and that Mr. Kohler
retained the possession of the Warranty Deed as security to pay his
commission.
On June 12, 1969, Mr. Kohler prepared (Exhibit 8), which
provided:

"Sellers agree to accept as part of down payment a 1967

Ford Thunderbird automobile. Buyer agrees to pay any and all indebtedness
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off against said vehicle and transfer clear title to sellers.
Possession of automobile to be transferred on May 10, 1969. This is
a condition of the completaion of the sale of four-plex located
at 562 North 7th West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Failure to comply with

this agreement constitutes a default in above said property.''
Paragraph No. 2 provided:

"Buyers agree to transfer title to

home and acreage in Howell, Utah, to Reuel S. Kohler and Dolores
M. Kohlerf his wife. Warranty Deed was executed April 1, 1969."
This Deed was being held in trust at that time by Mr. Kohler.
There was no agreement to change the status.
That under the terms of the original listing agreement, Mr.
Robinson was to pay the commission to Mr. Kohler.

There is nothing

said in the Exhibits 7 and 8 as to who was to pay Mr. Kohler's
commission, but the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Hansen is that
he was to pay the commission and that the property heretofore
conveyed to Mr. Kohler in trust was to be held as security for the
payment of Mr. Kohler's commission. Mr. Hansen asked why the Deed
was made to Kohler and they told him that they had a little deal
of their own pertaining to this property and for him to convey
it directly to Mr. Kohler and they would handle the Warranty Deed
themselves, which did not change Mr. Hansen's basic program (R. 23).

-6-

There was a very friendly relationship among the three of them.
Mr. Hansen had delivered the car to Mr. Robinson on May 10, 1969,
and the new agreement was not signed until June 12, 1969, and during
the entire period of this readjustment, the Deed to the property
was being held by Mr. Kohler, which was always in trust.
Mr. Hansen testified pertaining to this transaction as follows:
"Well, this is the conversation that took place in the
office between Kent Robinson, Mr. Kohler and Myself, and this is
where we agreed that I would pay the sales commission and that Mr.
Kohler would hold the Warranty Deed. (R. 16)
Q.

Is there anything in the agreement in regard to the

commission?
A.

The way this was worded is what I questioned at the time of

the wording, and then it was right then it was stated, "We all agree
to that."
Q.

What was stated at the time?

A.

That I was to pay Mr. Kohler the commission.

He was to hold

my property for collateral."
That the assuming of the commission and the transferring of the car
was to be the $7,500.00 down payment. Mr. Hansen did not intend to
give property of $7,500.00 for the commission (R. 28)
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Mr. Robinson told Mr. Hansen that the blue book value of the
automobile was $5,300.00 (R. 28)

The Thunderbird automobile was

not paid for and Mr. Hansen agreed to make payments, which he
did.
Mr. Hansfen offered to get the cash on his insurance policy
to pay the real estate commission, but Mr. Kohler stated that he
would be very secure holding the property for his collateral on the
commission and that he would continue to try to sell the Howell
property and that Mr. Kohler was to get his commission on the
Howell property when he sold it. (R. 30).
That the keys were given to Mr. Kohler when they completed the
first deal, (R. 32), before they found the encumbrance against the
entire farm.

Hansen talked to Kohler as to what he owed him

and he owed him $7,500.00 less sales commission.
and after they signed the agreement.
dropped.

They talked before

The arrangement was never

It was talked about at every conversation between Kohler

and Hansen. (R. 33 and 34).
If Mr. Kchler is allowed to retain the Howell property, then he
is being unjustly enriched.
That after the deal was closed, Mr. Kohler came to where Mr.
Hansen was working and wanted to know about the sewage system and he
said he was very small when it was laid out and he drew a diagram.
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Mr. Kohler said that he had someone on contract, a prospective
buyer for the house. At that time, and he did not tell Mr. Hansen
who, that if they get the sewer system working satisfactorily for
the prospective buyer, then he felt that he had it sold and we
could get together on a settlement.

This conversation occurred

about the middle of August or the middle of September.

(R. 17),

About two weeks after that, Mr. Hansen and Mr. Kohler had a
conversation in which Mr. Kohler said he had not settled anything
absolutely on the place, but he would be in touch with Mr. Hansen.
Mr. Kohler was going to try to sell the Howell property for Mr.
Hansen. (R. 18).
Sometime thereafter, about six or seven months later, Mr. Hansen
went to the office of Mr. Kohler and Mr. Kohler then told Mr. Hansen
he was not going to make any settlement. He said, "You will just
have to sue me.

I am not going to make a settlement. "

(R. 18-190•

Then Mr. Hansen got in touch with the Department of Business
Regulation, Real Estate Division, and filed a Complaint by sending
them a letter (R. 19, Exhibit 9).
Mr. Kohler answered the Complaint and the Real Estate Board
notified Mr. Hansen that he should bring a suit. (R. 20) and (Exhibit 24),
Minutes of Board Meeting.
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That the mortgage to the First Security Bank was paid as a
result of the provision in the agreement of the sale. Mr. Hansen
sold the property with the understanding that the mortgage would be
paid off. That thq mortgage to the bank on the farm was paid on
November 9f 1970. (R. 36)
That Mr. Hansen's version of the transaction was stated in
response to the Court's question to him on Page 37 as follows:
"THE COURT:

I had one question. Why did you agree to

transfer your 1967 Ford Thunderbird automobile to Mr. Robinson
as part of the down payment?
A. Well, in other words, that takes the place of the Howell
property.

That and the sales commission on the four-plex, which

Robinson would normally pay to Mr. Kohler, I was to pay that and
the car constituting the $7,500.00 down payment."
PART II OF THE STATEMENT OF FACTS
THIS IS THE SECTION OF THE BRIEF WHICH DISCUSSES THE FACTS WHICH
PERTAIN TO OHE CLAIM OF THE PIERCES AGAINST THE HANSENS.
After Hansen and Robinson consummated the deal, Mr. Hansen
would ask for a report from Mr. Kohler and he told him that it looked
like he was going to make a sale of the Howell property.

Finally,

Mr. Kohler told Mr. Hansen he would not make settlement with him and
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he would have to sue him.

(R. 18, 19). The following transactions

occurred pertaining to the Howell property:
September 5, 1969, a Lease was entered into between Kohlers
and the Pierces.

(R. 91, Exhibit 10).

October 1, 1970, a Uniform Real Estate Contract was entered
into between the Kohlers and Pierces.

(R. 93, 94, Exhibit 11).

November 9, 1970, the mortgage on the faim which included
the house was paid to the First Security Bank. (R. 36).
April 2, 1971, Complaint letter of Hansen to the State of Utah,
Department of Business Regulation, Real Estate Division. (R. 19,
Exhibit 9).
May 4, 1971, letter from Kohler to Real Estate Division, offered
in evidence, not received. (R. 138, Exhibit 25).
Minutes of Division of Real Estate consisting of minutes of June
16, 1971, June 17, 1971, June 24, 1971, and August 18, 1971, at which
meeting the Board recommended, "that Mr. Kohler pay Mr. Hansen $4,686.00
(this is the difference between the $7,500.00 value placed on the
home and the commission of $2,364.00 and the commission to Mr. Kohler
of $450.00 for selling the Howell Home).

Mr. Kohler is to inform the

Real Estate Division within ten days if this matter has been
satisfactorily concluded."

(R. 136, Exhbiit 24).
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October 7, 1971, Complaint in this case was filed.
October 18, 1971, Deed from Kohler to Pierces, (Exhibit 12} and
Real Estate Morrgage to the Farm Home Administration.

(Exhibit 14).

October 18, 1971, two title insurance policies, one to protect
mortagagor, Farm Home Administration and one to protect the Pierces.
(Exhibit 14 and 15)
October 19, 1971, Lis Pendens was filed.

(Exhibit 16)

March 12, 1971, Marv Hansen and his attorney talked to Mrs.
Pierce at Howell, Utah.

Conversation at Howell, Mrs. Pierce said

that they had a Deed and the Hansens informed Mrs. Pierce that they
had a lawsuit against Kohler, but that the Pierces had nothing to
worry about as long as they had title insurance because they would
be protected by the title insurance.
March 28, 1972, Earnest Money Receipt. (R. 105, Exhibit 17), Nicholas
to Pierce. Sales Price $12,300.00.
April, 1972, Pierces moved to Texas. (R. 99, 168).
May 30, 1972, Letter from Mr. Roe to Attorney Hadfield setting out
that Mr, Roe did not consider that the Lis Pendens was an encumbrance
on the property and a letter from Hadfield to Roe in which he stated
that he did not consider the Lis Pendens an encumbrance. (Exhibit 21).
November 13, 1972, conversation of Mr. and Mrs. Pierce and Mr. Robbins
in his office. Mr. Robbins advised them that they should get in touch

with their title insurance company and if the title insurance company
would not do anything,, then they should consult an attorney.
December 11, 1972, Pre-trial, Pierces attorney orally asked to
file Motion.

The first written notice that Kansens had of a claim

being made by the Pierces was Answer and Motion to Intervene and
Counterclaim filed on January 2# 1973,
We have re-read the Cross Complaint and Counterclaim, (R. 319-320,
321-322, 324) and there is nothing in the pleadings which asks that the
Lis Pendens be removed.

The entire pleadings and the case pertain

to collection of damages.
March 6, 1973, Judgment of D & B Electric against Pierces was
abstracted in the District Court of Box Elder County. (R. 228, 232).
The sale of the property in the sum of $12,500.00 from the
Griffiths which deal was not consummated because of the taxes and the
Judgment against the Pierces.

(R. 228, 229, 231).

June 19, 1973, Preliminary title report of

0. Dee Lund of the sale

to the Griffiths, (R. 227, 228), which report sets out that the Lis
Pendens was not a lien and he advised the Griffiths that they could
buy the property because the Lis Pendens only affected after acquired
property.
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ARGUMENT
PART I
POINT I
PROPERTY CONVEYED IN TRUST AS SECURITY. THAT IF KOHLER KEEPS THE
PROCEEDS FROM THE HOWELL PROPERTY, HE HAS BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED.
Plaintiffs ask in their Complaint that the defendants be required
to reconvey the property to the Plaintiffs or if they cannot reconvey
the property, then they pay to the Plaintiffs the difference between
$7,500.00 and the commission together with interest at the rate of
seven percent, and the said amount be declared to be a lien upon the
property and for such other and further relief as the Court deems just
and equitable and costs.
The original deal and the original Deed was made out from Hansens
to Kohlers. Kohler was a real estate agent and the closing agent
and was to hold the Deed to the Howell property and all instruments
in trust until the deal was consummated.

There was nothing in the

subsequent writings which changed the relationship of Kohler as Trustee.
The property in a regular deal should have been deeded to Mr.
Robinson, but because of a side deal between Kohler and Robinson, it
was ddeded to Mr. Kohler. Mr. Kohler never at any time had any interest
in the property except his real estate commissions.
If Mr. Kohler is to retain the property, he has been unjustly
enriched in the approximate sum of $5,000.00.
Therefore, there is either a resulting trust or a constructive trust.
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i
Mr. Kohler only had in the Howell property his sales commission. In
the first deal, he was to pay $2,000.00 to Robinson and his commissions
before he got the Howell property.
We have numerous cases in Utah pertaining to resulting and
constructive trusts.

In the case of Hawkins vs. Perry, 253 P. 2df

page 372, it cites other Utah cases.

I will discuss the Hawkins vs

Perry case for the general rule of law and make short comments about
the cases cited therein.

The Plaintiff, Hawkins, was a boy sixteen

years of age who had saved $300.00f

He gave this money to his

uncle, who was a minister and askedi him to buy a piece of property
and the title to the property was taken in the name of his uncle
and his uncle's wife.

The Court discusses in this case the

distinction between a resulting or constructive trust and on page
875 ®f thu Pacific the Court states:
"The constructive trust * * * is to be distinguished from a resulting trust. Where A's
money is used by B with A's consent in purchasing
property in the name of B, a resulting trust
arises in favor of A. Where A's money is used
by B without A's consent in purchasing property
in B's name, B holdsthe property upon a constructive trust for A. In the former case, the resulting trust arises because of the presumed intention
of the parties. In the latter case, the constructive trust is imposed upon B to prevent his unjust
enrichment."
We contend there was an agency between Kohlor and Hansen and there
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was a confidential relationship and that Mr. Kohler was unjustly
enriched. He got a $7,500.00 house at Howell, Utah, which ultimately
was mortgaged for $10,500.00. for his commission of $2,364.00 and
on page 375 of the Hawkins v. Perry case which quotes from a Utah
case of Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah 48, 95 P. 527, note [4] states:
"[4] Equity imposes a constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through fraud or
the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary
or confidential relationship. The Utah decision
of Chadwick v. Arnold declares * * * that a
trust ex maleficio [constructive trust] arises
whenever a person acquires the legal title to
property of another by means of an intentional false
or fraudulent verbal promise to hold the same for
a certain purpose, and having thus obtained the
title, retains and claims the property as his own."
It is now well recognized that actual fraud is
not necessary, but may be presumed where there
is a relationship of confidence between the parties
to a transaction and there are "other circumstances
tending to show that some advantage had been
taken by the dominant party with a consequent abuse
of confidence."
In Haws v. Jensen, we quote:
"A constructive trust will be imposed even though
at the time of the transfer the transferee intended
to perform the agreement, and even though he was not
guilty of undue influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the confidential relation
consists merely in the failure of the transferee
to perform his promise."
In the case of Haws v. Jensen, 209 P. 2d 229, 116 U. 212, a mother
conveyed property to her daughter for the purpose of the property being
maintained for the rest of her brothers and sisters.
died and her husband claimed the property.

-16-

The daughter

He maintained that the

statute of frauds appliedf but the Court on page 231 states:
"[If 2] Admittedly there is no writing evidencing
Mrs. Haws' intention that the property conveyed
by her be held in trust by Amber. Howeverf under
certain circumstances existing at the time a
conveyance in trust is made, no writing evidencing an intent to create a trust is required. In
those instances, equity will impress a constructive trust upon the property in favor of the person
or persons designated by the grantor as the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the oral trust. A
constructive trustf being an equitable remedy to
prevent unjust enrichment, arises by operation
of law and is not within the statute of frauds.
Section 45(1) (b)f of the Restatement of the Law
of Trusts is applicable to the facts of the instant
case:
' (1) Where the owner of an interest in land
transfers in inter vivos to another in trust for
a third person, but no memorandum properly evidencing
the intention to create a trust is signed, and the
transferee refuses to perform the trustf the
transferee holds the interest upon a constructive
trust for third person.'"
And furtherf on Page 232f the Court says:
"[5] the defendant's second contention that the lower
court erred in admitting parol testimony tending
to establish an oral trust must also fail. Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Sec. 38 (3) states:
'If the owner of property transfers it intervivos
to another person by a written instrument in which
it is not declared that the transferee is to take
the property for his own benefit or that he is to
hold it in trust# intrinsic evidence may be
admitted to show that he was intended to hold the
property in trust either for the transferor or for
a third party.'
'Ttfe similarly held in Cory v. Robertsf 82 Utah 445,
25 P. 2d 940; Peterson v. Peterson, 105 Utah 133#
141 P. 2d 882; and in Barrett v. Vickers, 100 Utah
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534, 116 P. 2d 772, that a deed absolute on its face
can be shown to have been intended to be in trust."
In the case of Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 49 P.2d 403, 87
U. 364, on Page 404, second paragraph, first column, line 8, it says:
"While the fiduciary relationship is a prerequisite to the creation of a constructive trust, such
as we are here considering, yet the trust does not
arise until that relationship has been betrayed
or violated. It is the confidential relationship
plus the abuse of the confidence thus imposed, that
authorized equity to construct a trust for the
benefit of the party whose confidence has been abused."
(citing cases)
"It is not the nominal, but the actual relation of
the parties which must be examined in order to
determine whether there has been a breach of
trust. The fact that the parties may have been
long standing friends or neighbors (which is adverted
to by some of the text-writers) may be one of the
elements to be weighed, but in its last analysis
the test is the reposing of confidence--in the sense
of trust-- and its abuse, which must determine the
result."
We quote further from Page 404, paragraph [3]:
"[3] It is true that upon the establishment of
certain fiduciary relationships and transactions
between the parties to that relationship, equity will
presume fraud, the abuse of confidence, and place
the burden of proving good faith and fairness upon
the dominant party in the relationship. In such cases
the presumption of fraud may be based upon the
relationship alone and relieves the party from
proving the fraud, but the fraud is nevertheless
an essential element. By the presumption equity
supplies that element. The relationships wherein
such presumption has been indulged are parent and child,
principal and agent, attorney and client."
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There is a relationship of principal and agent between Hansens
and Kohlers and Kohler was bound not to take advantage of Mr. Hansen
by having the real estate in his name.
In the case of Corey v. Roberts# 25 P. 2df Page 940, second column
bottom of page, paragraph 3f the Court says:
"3. Mortgages, Key 32(6)
In determining whether deed absolute on face is
intended as mortgage, court should consider existence
of continuing obligation to pay debt; relative
values; contemporaneous and subsequent acts and
declarations of parties; form of written evidences
of transactions and character of testimony;
relationship of parties; and apparent purposes to be
accomplished."
On Page 947 of the Pacific, first column, last paragraph, the Court
says:
"Whether the instrument should be treated as
a deed or mortgage of course depends upon the
facts and circumstances of the transaction,
the object and purpose for which it was given and
received, and whether it was given as security or
for a bargain and sale of the land.". Duerden v.
Solomon, 33 Utah 468, 473, 94 P. 978; Thomas v.
Ogden State Bank (Utah) 13 P. 2d 636, 639."
On Page 948, second column, bottom of first paragrpah, the Court says:
"Any marked undervaluation in price will vitiate
a release or conveyance of the mortgagor interest."
This case is a long case detailing a lot of facts and holds that
the deeds which were given in the case were merely mortgages and not
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a conveyance.
In this casef we have a case in which the property was of greater
value than the debt which was to be paid to Mr. Kohler.
In the case of Newel v. Halloran 250 P. 986f on page 988f paragraph 3f second paragraph, we quote:
"Courts of equity have carefully refrained from
defining the particular instances of fiduciary
nrelations in such manner that other and perhaps
new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an
overwhelming weight of authority, that the
principle extends to every possible case in which
a fiduciary relation exists as a fact in which
there is confidence reposed on one side, and the
resulting superiority and influence on the other,
the relation and the duties involved in it need not
be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic or
merely personal."
In the case of Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 212 P. 526, this was the
case involving the promotion of a mining claim and certain property
was conveyed by the plaintiff as his share of the money to be used in
the promotion. That the defendant was to raise further money which
he did not do. He conveyed the property and the court held it was a
resulting trust. On page 529, paragraph No. 3, we quote:
"Thus, if one party procures the legal title to
property from another by fraud or misrepresentation
or concealment, or if a party makes use of such
influential or confidential relation which he holds
towards the owner of the legal title, to obtain
such legal title from him upon more advantageous
terms than he could otherwise have obtained it,

equity will convert such party thus obtaining
property into a trustee. If a person obtains the
legal title to property by such arts or acts
or circumstances of circumvention imposition,
or fraud, or if he obtains it by virtue of a
confidential relation and influence under such
circumstances that he ought not, according to the
rules of equity and good conscience as administered
in chancery, to hold and enjoy the beneficial
interest of the property, courts of equity in
order to administer complete justice between the
parties will raise a trust by construction out
of such circumstances or relations; and this trust
they will fasten upon the conscience of the offending
party, and will convert him, into a trustee of
the legal title, and order him to hold it or to
execute the trust in such manner as to protect
the rights of the defrauded party and promote the
safety and interests of society. Such trusts are
called constructive trusts."
The same principle is enunciated in almost the same
language in 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (4th Ed.), Section
1044.
The second headnote to Henderson v. Murray, 108 Minn.
76, 121 N.W. 214, 133 Am. St. Rep. 412, announces
the same general principle as follows:
"Where, however, a party obtains the legal title
to land from another by fraud, or by taking
advantage of confidential or fiduciary relations,
or in any other unconscientious manner, so that he
cannot justly retain the property, equity will
impress a constructive trust upon it in favor of
the party who is equitably entitled to it."
This general equitable principle is recognized by
all of the authorities. This court is committed to
it. See Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 Utah, 48, 95 Pac. 527
See, also 39 Cyc. 172 et seq.;Pollard v. Mc Kenney,
69 Neb. 742, 96 N. W. 679, 101 N.W. 9."
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In this case there was confidence reposed in Kohler by Hansen
giving him the Deed to his property before the deal was closed.
Of coursef he was holding the property as escrow agent. Alsof
Hansen had conveyed the title to the car to Mr. Robinson prior to the
time of signing any papers.
PART I
POINT II
STATUTE OF FRAUDS HAS NO BEARING UPON THIS CASE.
They had raised in this casef the question of the statute of
fraud. We have a number of Utah cases which hold that the Statute
of Fraud does not apply to resulting or constructive trust.

Anderson v

Cereone at 180 p. 586 on page 588, fourth paragraph, the Court says:
"[4] Appellant's plea of the statute of frauds is not
supported by authority. The single case cited
(Skeen v. Marriott, 22 Utah, 73, 61 Pac. 296)
related to an express trust and therefore is
not in point. The trust in this case is a
resulting trust, to which the statute of
frauds does not apply. Chambers v. Emery, supra."
Also, see Chambers v. Emeiy, 13 Utah, 374, 45 P. 192, Skeen v.
Marriott 22 U. 73, 61 P. 296.

Also see Chactorick v. Arnold 95 P. 527, at page 532, where the Court
says:
"In Bispham's Principles of Equity (7th Ed.)
Section 218 in speaking of the enforcement of trusts ex
maleficio, the rule is stated that "the ground of
these decisions is that the statute of frauds is
not to be used as a shield for fraud; and that
i
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where a party has by his promise to buy or hold
or dispose of real estate for the benefit of
anotherf induced action or forbearance by reliance
upon such promise it would be a fraud that the promise
should not be enforced; and the method of enforcement will be through the machinery of a trust."
In the case of George R. Taylor v. Eva Turnerf 492 P. 2d 1343,
27 U. 2d 39 they hold that the deed that was given was in fact a
security transaction and held that there was a trust and on page
1346, the Court discusses the question of the statute of frauds and
says as follows:
"Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
its determination that the plaintiffs were the
owners of the real property in Salina, Utah, and the
defendant held the property in trust to secure
certain funds which were paid to plaintiffs.
Defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds, Section 255-1, U.C.A. 1953; he urges that there was no
instrument in writing concerning this alleged trust
relating to real property."Section 25-5-2, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"The next preceding section [25-5-1] shall not be
construed * * * to prevent any trust from arising
or being extinguished by implication or operation
of law.
2
In Wasatch Mining Co. v. Jennings this court construed
the foregoing statute and stated that trusts arising
by implication or operation of law are expressly
excluded from the effects of the Statute of Frauds
and a deed of conveyance, though absolute in form,
if given to secure a debt, is in equity treated
as a mortgage—a trust by operation of law.
The Restatement, Trusts (2d) Section 44, provides:
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(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to another in trust for the
transferor but no memorandum properly evidencing
the intention to create a trust is signed, as
required by the Statute of Frauds, and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee
holds the interest upon a constructive trust for
the transferor, if
(c) the transfer was made as security for an
indebtedness of the transferor.
[4] The trial court did not err in its determination that the deed, although absolute in form, was
in fact executed as security for a loan of money.
Defendant was a constructive trustee, who held
title to secure the funds advanced to pla.:j.ntiffs.
Chadwick v. Arnold, 95 P. 527, 34 U. 48, on page 532 of the Pacific,
the Court says:
"The relief granted by courts of equity, where a
trust ex maleficio is raised, is not founded on
the specific performance of the oral contract,
but upon the principle that equity turns the fradulent procurer of a legal title into a trustee to
get at him. That is to say, courts of equity, in
order to administer complete justice between the
parties, will raise a trust by construction out
of the circumstances and relations and this trust
they will fasten upon the conscience of the
offending party and will convert him into a
trustee of the legal title and order him to
hold it for the benefit of the owner ot t^o
execute the trust in such manner as to protect
the rights of the defrauded party. The rule is
well stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence,
supra, that "equity does not pretend to enforce
verbal promises in the face of the statute, it
endeavors to prevent and punish fraud by taking
from the wrongdoer the fruits of his deceit,
and it accomplishes this object by its beneficial
far-reaching doctrine of constructive trusts."
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In the case of Wheelwright v. Roman 165 Pacific 513, o n Page
516f second column# second paragraph the Court says:
"In Cooney v. Glynn, supra, in the course of the
opinion the law is stated thus:
It has been established by a number of decisions
in this state that where confidential relations
exist between two parties, and one of them
executes a conveyance of real estate to the
other, upon a parol promise by the other that
he will hold it for the benefit of the grantor, or
for the benefit of some third person in whom
the grantor is interested, there being no other
consideration for the conveyance, a trust arises by
operation of law in favor of the grantor, or in
favor of the third person, for whom, the property
is to be held. It is the violation of the parol
promise which constitutes the fraud upon which the
trust arises. If made in good faith, and if it
is of a continuing nature* the performance of it
for a time does not prevent a trust from arising
when it is broken and repudiated/'
In the case of Acott v. Tomlirison 337 P. 2d 720, and 9 U. 2d 71,
the Court held on page 724:
"From the summary of facts just stated, there is
ample basis for the determination made by the
trial court that the defendant agreed to hold the
property under an express trust; or alternatively,
that the transaction was so unfair and lacking
in disclosure of material facts to plaintiffs
to require the imposition of a constructive trust
on the property for their benefit."
And also on Page 724, second column, second paragraph sixth line:
"The gist of his contention is that the plaintiffs
trusted him when they should not have done so.
It does not lie in his mouth to thus claim advantage of his own wrong and reap a reward for deception.
The very essence of trust is that confidence may
be reposes in the trustee."
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In this casef Hansen should certainly have not trusted Kohler.
Barrett v. Vickers 116 P. 2d 772f 100 Utah 534. This is the
case in which the father owned the property in his lifetime. The
property was foreclosed.

The father died. He owned a ranchf but it

was mortgaged to the State of Utah.

The State of Utah foreclosed on

it. After the foreclosuref one of his sons purchased the property.
The contention is made that he purchased it for all the Vickers children.

They held it to be a trust on Page 775, first column, paragraph

No, 2 f which reads as follows:
"It excepts from the requirement of writing, trusts
arising by "act of operation of law." There is
no question in this State about that matter. Parol
e vidence is admissible to show a trust relationship
by operation of law. Cory v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445,
25 P. 2d 940."
i

In the case of Kitt v. Kitt, 294 P. 2d 791, 4 Utah 2d, 384,
which was the case involving an appeal from a Judgment imposing a
resulting trust on land acquired in the name of appellant father from
the State in 1939 for $3,500.00 in favor of respondent sons.
The contention was that theyhad the following defenses and we
quote second paragraph, page 792, and the first part of paragraph 1
and 2 as follows:
"Counsel for appellant earnestly urges that 1)
respondents did not contribute enough to the
purchase price as would justify a resulting
trust in their favor, and that 2) respondent's
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evidence was indefinite and conflicting as to
negate such a trust, and 3) that anyway, any
claim that respondents asserted was barred by
a) the statute of frauds and b) the statute of
limitations.
[lf2] There appears to be sufficient clear and
convincing evidence in the lengthy record, which
if believed by the lower court, would justify a
declaration of trust in favor of respondents
and the conclusion that neither of the defensive
statutes mentioned would apply."
Child v. Child 332 P. 2d 981, 8 Utah 2d 261, states that the
father bought a piece of property and borrowed money from his son
and put the title in the boy's name.

The Court held that there was

a resulting trust and that the father was entitled to the property.
On page 987, paragraph 11, the Court says:
"(11) Upon the basis of the facts as found, equity
and good conscience would not permit one in
Eugene's position to reap the benefits of his
father's foresight, planning and efforts simply
because his father placed title in him to assure
him that his loan would be repaid. It was to
avoid any such injustice that the device of
resulting trust had its origin. Under the
agreement as determined by the trial court a
trust resulted in favor of Plaintiff Harry Child."
Hansen expected Mr. Kohler to make a settlement with him, which
he didn't do and when he didn't make a settlement, he went to the real
estate board and then the real estate board told him that he would have
to determine the matter by suit because Kohler would not pay him.
Hansen was the person who caused the mortgage to be paid after
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closing the deal.

PART II OF THE BRIEF
IN PART II OF THE BRIEF WE WILL DISCUSS THE LIABILITY IF ANY OF THE
HANSENS TO THE PIERCES.
IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT FACTS PROVEN TO
CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR SLANDER OF TITLE. TO HAVE SLANDER OF
TITLE, THERE ARE FOUR NECESSARY ELEMENTS. IF ANY ONE IS LACKING, IT WOULD
PREVENT RECOVERY. IT IS OUR CONTENTION THAT ALL FOUR ELEMENTS ARE
LACKING. THE FOUR ELEMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
FIRST
THE LIS PENDENS IS PRIVILEGED BECAUSE IT IS PART OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
SECOND
LIS PENDENS HAS NO EFFECT ON CONVEYANCES MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE LIS PENDENS.
THIRD
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE FALSE AND CONTAIN FALSE ALLEGATIONS.
FOURTH
FOR THERE TO BE A CAUSE OF ACTION, THERE MUST BE MALICE.
We will discuss each of these points separately numbered Point I,
Point II, Point III, and Point IV.
POINT I
THE LIS PENDENS IS PRIVELEGED BECAUSE IT IS PART OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS.
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That the Deed from the Kohlers to the Pierces was filed on the
18th day of Octoberf 1971, at 3:30 p.m. and the Lis Pendens was
filed on the 19th day of October, 1971# at 10:30 a.m., which was
mailed from Salt Lake City, to Brigham City.

That the filing of

the Complaint and the filing of the Lis Pendens is a judicial proceed,
ing and is therefore privileged. The Complaint was filed October 7 # 1971.
At 53 C.J.S. under Libel and Slander, Section 277# Privilege,
Page 397f it states:
"277. Privilege
Defamatory matter published in due course of a
judicial proceedings, pertinent to the inquiry,
is absolutely privileged and will not sustain an
action for slander of title; also in such actions
the defendant may be immune from liability on the
ground that the communication is qualifiedly
privileged.
As in case of defamation against the person,
discussed supra s 104, it has been held that defamatory matter published in the course of a
judicial proceeding, pertinent or material to
the inquiry, is absolutely privileged, and will
not sustain an action for slander of title.
Also in these actions defendant may be immune
from liability on the ground that the communication
is qualifiedly privileged.
and it has been stated
that the rules governing communications qualifiedly
privileged are the same in slander of title as
in ordinary libel and slander.
A communication
disparaging another's title or property is qualifiedly
privileged if the publication was honestly made
by defendant, believing it to be true, and there
was a reasonable occasion or exigency in the conduct
of his own affairs in matters where his interest
99
was concerned, which fairly warranted the publication.
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Thus an assertion by the defendant that he
has some right, title or interest in the property,
irade in an honest belief of its truth, defendant
supposing that he is entitled to the interest he
asserts, is qualifiedly privileged and no action
for slander of the title can be maintained, although
the statements are in fact untrue.
If defendant,
believing himself to have an exclusive patent,
issues a notice of an alleged infringement by
plaintiff in good faith as a warning against an
invasion of his rights, a mistake on his part as to
the validity of his claim will not render him
liable to an action.
So the discontinuance
or loss of a suit with respect to property will
not render the person bringing it liable for
slander of title where he had reasonable grounds
for believing that he had a good cause of action.
Applying the privilege doctrine as set out above to the present
case, the Lis Pendens, is part of the judicial proceedings and there
is nothing in this record or the pleadings that is false.

(Complaint

256, 257, 258). That the Complaint states that the property
was sold.

That all the facts in the Complaint have been determined

to be facts, except the conclusions of ownership and in the prayer
of the Complaint it sets out that if the property cannot be reconveyed,
then the amount of damages was to be determined.
We submit that there is nothing in the pleadings or the testimony
of any of the parties that the facts are untrue. We alleged in the
Complaint that the plaintiff has offered to pay Mr. Kohler the commissions, but that Mr. Kohler has refused to reconvey the propertyand that

(

the Plaintiff is informed that he has sold the property.
When this case was filed and when the Lis Pendens was filed#
the Plaintiffs nor their attorney had any knowledge that the title
had been conveyed out of the Kohlers. Mr. Kohler had told Mr.
Hansen that he had a contract to sell.

The Lis Pendens is for the

sole purpose of giving notice that there was a suit of Hansen v.
Kohler.
In the case of Albertson v. Raboff, 295 P. 2d, 405f which is
a California case# the California statute is almost identical to
ours/ on page 406, head note #5, 6, and 7, are as follows:
"5. Lis Pendens key 18.
The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis
pendens is to secure the same result as actual
notice by giving constructive notice of pendency
of proceedings. West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc.
II 409, 1908, Subd. 2.
6. Lis Pendens key 22 (1)
Notice of lis pendens is purely incidental
to action wherein it is filed, refers specifically
to such action and has no existence apart
from it. West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc. s 1908,
subd. 2.
7 . Libel and Slander key 136
The recordationof a notice of lis pendens is in
effect a republication of the pleadings and hence
is clothed with absolute privilege in action
for disparagement of title. West's Ann. Code
Civ. Proc. si 409, 1908, Subd. 2."
And on page 408, paragraphs 3 4, bottom of paragrpah, is as follows:
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"Thus, subdivision 2 of section 47 states, the
long-established rule that publications made in
the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely
privileged, Gosewisch v. Doran, 161 Cal. 511,
513-515, 119 p. 656; Donnell v. Linforth, 11
Cal. App. 2d 25, 28-29, 52 P. 2d 937; Moore v.
United States Fid. & Guaranty Co . 122 Cal. App.
205/210, 9 P. 2d. 562; Rest., Torts, es 635-639."
And on page 409, in the middle of head note 8, 9, it states:
"If the publication has a reasonable relation to
the action and is permitted by law, the absolute
privilege attaches. See Rest. Torts, s 587;
Youmans v. Smith 153 N.Y. 214, 220, 47 N. E. 265
Karushaur v. Lavin, Sup. 39 N.Y.S. 2d 880, 882883; Zirn v. Cullom, 187Misc, 241, 63 N.Y.S.2d
439, 440-441; Inselberg v. Trosty, 190 Misc.
507, 77 N.Y.S. 2d 457, 458; of 39A.L.R. 2d
840, 861. It therefore attached to the recordation
of a notice of lis pendens, for such publication
is permitted by law, and like other documents that
may be filed in an action, it has a reasonable
relation thereto and it is immaterial that it is
recorded with the County Recorder instead 0f being
filed with the County Clerk."
It is our contention that the Lis Pendens is part of the legal
proceedings under'the common law and the common law was not changed by
our statute a Lis Pendens is privileged, the same as a lawsuit.
POINT II
LIS PENDENS HAS NO EFFECT ON CONVEYANCES MADE PRIOR TO THE FILING OF
THE LIS PENDENS
Our statute pertaining to the Lis Pendens provides that it only
affects the property and title of the property after the filing of the
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Lis Pendens. Lis Pendens has no effect on conveyances prior to the
filing of the Lis Pendens.
We quote from Section 78-40-2, U.C.A. 9, as follows:
"From the time of filing such notice for record
only shall a purchaser or encumbrancer of the property
affected thereby be deemed to have constructive
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of
its pendency against parties designated by their
real names."
In the instant case, the Lis Pendens had no effect on the Deed
from Kohler to Pierces that was filed prior to the filing of the Lis
Pendens•
The following quotations pertain to Lis Pendens, its definition
and its origin in history.
In 38 C. J. under Lis Pendens, Section 1, on page 4, gives
what Lis Pendens was and I quote:
"A. IN GENERAL. Lis meanj a suit, action,
controversy, or2dispute,
and "Lis Pendens" means
a pending suit.
It is maxim of the commonlaw
that pendents lite nihil innovetur--pending the suit
nothing should be changed --and, subject to certain
limitations and qualifications hereinafter stated,
one who acquires from a party to the proceeding „
an interest in property,
which is at that time
involved in a litigation in a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person
of the one from whom the interest is acquired, taJces
subject to the rights of the parties to the litiaation
as finally determined by the judgment or decree,
and is as conclusively bound by the result of the
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Litigation as if he had been a party thereto from the
outset.
This rule with the principles governing its
application and limitations is technically known as the
doctrine of lis pendens. "
We are quoting the above because it shows that under the common
law that a person subject to a suit was bound to find out what suits,
if any had been filed affecting tho title to real property.

The Utah

statute provided that the Lis Pendens had to be filed in the Recorder's
Officef but under the common law there was no notice necessary to be
given. At 38 C. J. Page 6# paragraph No. 2, the Court says:
"B. ORIGIN AND HISTORY". While the doctrine of lis
pendens is commonly referred as having first been
formulated by Sir Francis Bacon, in 1618 as the twelfth
of his "Ordinances in Chancery" its exact origin is
difficult to determine.
It was not peculiar to courts
of equity,
and it was common to courts both at law
and in equity before it was promulagated in the
"Ordinances in Chancery."
It has been said that
the doctrine of lis pendens was older in law than
in equity
and was adopted from the common law
courts in analogy to the rule existing in real actions
to the effect that if "defendant aliens after pendency of
the writ, the judgment in the action will overrule such
alienations. "
C. REASONS FORf AND FOUNDATION OF DOCTRINE — 1 . PUBLIC
POLICY. It is commonly stated that the doctrine
of lis pendens is based upon considerations of public
policy and convenience,
the rule being necessary to the
administration of justice in order that decisions in
2.
pending suits may be binding and may be given full effect #
that there may be an end to litigation,
and that the
purpose of a pending suit may not be^defeated by sucessive
alienations and transfers of title.
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2. NOTICE. While the doctrine of lis pendens is frequently spoken of as one implied or constructive notice,
the accuracy2of this statement is denied by many
authorities,
its true foundation, according to such
authorities, resting as has already been stated, upon
principles of public policy and necessity,
which
forbid a litigant party to give to others pending the
litigation rights to the property in dispute so an to
prejudice the opposite party. For practical purposes,
it is ordinarily immaterial whether the doctrine of
lis pendens be considered as based on constructive notice or
on public policy,
although if the doctrine is based
on the theory of necessity and public policy, it
nay prevent its extension.
3. RES JUDICATA. Under the view that the doctrine
of lis pendens is based upon the necessity that
there may be an end of litigation,
it is in
fact a phase of the law of res judicata,
being
an exception to the rule that^a judgment is conclusive only upon parties thereto
to the effect
that, in certain actions and suits involving^property,
purchasers pendente lite are also concluded, and
privies to the judgment rendered so far as the
«fi
consequences are concerned, if not technically so.
Since the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens
„
nay be harsh in particular instances
and is arbitrary,
it will not be given effect when the reasons which
give rise to it do not require its enforcement,
and the limitations to the rule will be observed
with the same rigidity as exists in the application
of the rule itself.
On the.other hand, the rule
admits of but few exceptions. "
To the common law, it was not necessary to give notice. They were
just bound by the Judgment. Our statute has changed this rule so that
to give notice to any siibsequent party dealing with the property that
you must file it in the Recorder's Office.
And further on in the same works, 38 C. J. Section 9, page 11, it says:
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"Where the lis pendens statute has no negative words
or repealing clause/ it is regarded as supplemental
to the common law and not as repealing it, so that the
common law will-govern in all cases not covered
by the statute.
Where a statute does not require a
notice to be filed the common-law rule of notice arising
from the commencement of the action itself prevails. "
Our Utah Lis Pendens statute only gives notice after it is filed
but if it had been filed a few hours earlier, it would have given
notice that any interest that Mr. Kohler tried to convey after the
filing of the Lis Pendens would have been subject to Plaintiffs' lien.
POINT III
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WOULD HAVE TO BE FALSE AND CONTAIN FALSE ALLEGATIONS.
TO HAVE SLANDER OF TITLE THE INSTRUMENT CB THE WORD SPOKEN HAS TO BE
FALSE.
At 53 C. J. Section 273, page 393, it states:
"273. FAL3ITT.
The falsity of the words spoken is an essential
element of a cause of action for slander of title.
The falsity of the words published is a necessary
element to maintain an action for slander of title.
If the alleged defect or infirmity in title or property
exists, the action will not lie. 'however malicious
the intent to injure may have been.
Indeed, it has
been held that in order to constitute malice there must be
a false statement. "
In the instant case, there is no false statement.

Everything that

was said in the Complaint is true.
We have a Utah case which holds that if the allegations are true
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there is no grounds for slander of title.

It is the case of Pender v.

Dowse, 265 Pacific 2d. 664 on page 649, the Court says:
"For one to be liable for slander of title he must
publish 'matter which is untrue and disparaging
to another's property in land-' (Emphasis ours)
See Restatement of the Law on Torts. Vol. Ill,
Sea. 624, and in Section 634 it is stated thus:
'The publisher of matter disparaging to
another's property in land, chattels
or intangible things or to the quality
thereof is not libale under the rule
stated in sees. 624 and 626-7 unless the
disparaging matter, if a statement of
fact, is untrue, or if an expression of
opinion is dishonestly made.'
Here Dowse had a valid judgment for costs against
Pender. His acts in having the execution issued,
levying on the property and having it sold at
sheriff's sale all reflected the true nature of
the claim, that is that these actions were taken to
satisfy a judgment for costs in the sum of $22.80
and expenses incurred. These facts appeared upon
the record and were all trUe. Being true, they could
not be the basis for a suit for slander of title
and the court therefore erred in granting attorney
fees as special damages for slander of title and punitive
damages for the malice involved."
We submit that the basis for slander of title would have to be the
allegations in the Complaint. We submit that everything in the Complaint
was borne out by the evidence and by the facts even to.the allegation
that he "understood the property had been sold. That there should be no
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question that Mr. Hansen had the right to assume that he was entitled
to recover from Mr. Kohler because he had a decision from the real
estate board that he was entitled to recover $4,686.00 from Mr. Kohler.
(Exhibit 24).
That there has been a complete disclosure to counsel and counsel
is the one who prepared the complaint and prepared the Lis Pendens.
POINT IV
FOR THERE TO BE A CAUSE OF ACTION, THERE MUST BE MALICE.
We submit to this court that there is nothing in the record that
shows that there was any malice.
At 53 C.J.S. under Libel and Slander, Section 274, Page 394, it
states:
"274. MALICE
Malice is a necessary ingredient in order to entitle
the plaintiff to recover for slander of title.
Malice is a necessary ingredient in order to entitle
the plaintiff to recover for slander of title.'2
Indeed, it has
been said that malice is the gist
of
170
»
0
the action.
Such malice, however, may be express
or implied. * The action cannot be maintained if the
claim was asserted by defendant in good faith, and if the
act complained of was founded on probable cause or was
prompted by a reasonable belief although the statement may have been false. Thus the action cannot
be maintained if the claim was asserted by defendant
in good faith on the advice of counsel/? especially
where defendant had revealed the material facts fully
and correctly to counsel,™ and bad faith on the part
of counsel is immaterial.'9"
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In this case, not only did the Hansens make a full disclosure
to counsel, but they filed a Complaint before the Real Estate Board
(Exhibit 9), and the Real Estate Board held that Kohlers should
make a settlement by Kohlers paying to the Hansens $4,686.00,
(Exhibit 24), which the Kohlers refused to pay.
The complaint (letter) of the Hansens to the Real Estate
Commissions (Exhibit 9), has substantially the same allegations
that are set out in the Complaint.
The opening statement of defendant's counsel (R. 5,6, 7) and
the Kohlers' Answers to Plaintiff's Interrogatories, (R. 268), have
the same facts with the exception that Kohlers and their counsel
contended that Hansen only had a thirty-day period to get the
property back.
That the Complaint and the Lis Pendens were prepared by counsel
and the evidence sustains the facts alleged in the Complaint. However,
the Court concluded that the plaintiff did not have a cause of
action.
The suit in which the Lis Pendens was filed was the case of
Hansen v. Kohler and there was nothing said in regards to the Pierces,
and whether or not they had good title.
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If the Pierces got their

Deed on record before the Hansens' Lis Pendens, then they were
first in time, and under our statute, their title was not affected by
the Lis Pendens.
That under the Lis Pendens Statute, 78-49-2, the Lis Pendens
may be filed at the time of or after the filing of the Complaint.
The filing of a Lis Pendens before the filing of a Complaint or
without a Complaint could be actionable. Counsel inquired (Exhibit
P. 30), before the filing of the Complaint and sending the Lis Pendens
to see if the property was still in the name of Kohler.
In the Utah case of Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P. 2d 510, allowed
recovery, but it did not change the law that we are contending for
and on page 521, it states:
"The Defendant and appellant, Leslie Kidman,
contends that the Utah Cases and the law generally
regarding slander of title require that before
liability can be found the recorder of the
slanderous document must have known that he
asserted a false claim without any foundation or
right."
We cited the case of C. Ed. Lewis v. Dragos, 266 P. 2d. 499,
1 U. 2d, 328. This is the case where the defendants made statements
that the Motel was on his property, but the case to determine this
fact was on appeal to the Supreme Court and the Court on page 500 states:
"Under the circumstances, we feel that such
statements made by one of the litigants concerning
the subject matter of litigation are not and should
not be construed as a slander of title nor a tortious
interference with a possible contractual right of
stranger to the title."

-/in.

There is nothing in this record that shows any malice or any
meanness on the part of the Hansens. They were acting honestly.
We have set out in the Brief, the letter of Mr. Roe,(Exhibit 21)
the letter of Mr. Hadfield (Exhibit 22), and the opinion of Attorney
0. Dee Lund, (R. 228, Exhibit 23), all of whom were of the opinion that
the Lis Pendens was not a cloud on the title.
The Farm Home Administration, for some reason not disclosed by
the record, did not want to release their mortgage and take a second
mortgage, although the opinion of three attorneys was that the title
was marketable.

This did not matter anyway because there was a sub-

sequent deal in which the Pierces were to be paid more money than they
were to be paid under the Nicholas deal.
Plaintiff's attorney has always been of the opinion that the Lis
Pendens would not be a cloud on the title. (R.248 ) All the effect
it would have would be is if the Lis Pendens had been filed before
Kohler's interest in the property was conveyed.

Then it would have

been a lien on his interest. That there was no actual request ever
made of plaintiff to remove the Lis Pendens or telling what trouble
they were having with their title. There was no prayer in the Cross
Complaint and Counterclaim that a cloud should be removed.

The reason

is not clear, but the second insurance company did not want to insure the
title, but there was never any reason given.
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1

At the time of this deal there was never anything said to
Hansens or their attorney about the troubles that Pierces were
having.

The alleged conversation with the Hansen's attorney

occurred after that and after the Pierces had taken back the property.
That in the Contract to Purchase between Kohlers and Pierces,
(Exhibit 11) # it sets out in paragraph No. 6:

"It is understood

that there presently exists an obligation against said property
in favor of First Security Bank of Tremonton with an unpaid balance
of $

as of Date 6/21/67."

That the Pierces knew at the time they

entered into the contract to purchase that there was not a clear title,
and if there had been any inquiry made at that time, they could have
found out about the troubles that Kohler and Hansens were having.
A Motion for Summary Judgment against the Intervenors and Counterclaimants was made, (R. 362), supported by Affidavit of Marvin W.
Hansen.

(R. 360-361).

A supplemental Affidavit was made (R. 365 to

372), and a Memorandum of Authorities was filed (R. 373 to 377).
This raises the same questions that we have raised in part II
of the Brief and we sufcmit that the Motion for Summary Judgment
should have been granted and that the evidence at the time of the
trial did not vary the evidence as set out in the affidavits and
exhibits.
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PART III
DAMAGES
The Court awarded damages for (1) attorney feesf (2) damages
for travelling expenses for the taking of the deposition and other
expenses connected with taking the deposition and (3) loss of rent,
(R. 458).
We will argue the damages for attorney fees and the damages for
travelling expenses for taking the deposition together because we think
these elements come under the same rule that a person would be
entitled to their attorney fees and their costs only in removing
a cloud# no award of attorney fees in a damage suit for slander of
title.
POINT I
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS OF DEPOSITION
Damages can only be awarded for the removal of the cloud from
the property not for the recovery of damages for the slander of title
There was no motion filed in this case asking that the cloud be
removed.

There was no written notice# no written letter to the

Hansens asking that the purported cloud be removed.
was filed to remove the cloud.

No Complaint

Nothing was done by the firm of

Vlahos and Gale or Mr. Knowlton to remove the cloud.
was done was to recover damages.
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Everything that

The Cross Complaint (R. 319 to 324) is entirely a suit for
damages.

There is not one sentence or one word in the Cross Complaint

which asks for the removal of a cloud on the title.
The expenses of deposition and attorney fees were incurred for
the purpose of recovering damages, not for the removal of any alleged
cloud.

The deposition of the Interveners was taken because of the

suit for damages.
We know of no case in Utah which gives attorney fees in a
damage suit. No litigant is entitled to attorney fees if it is
not provided by statute or by written instrument or when there has
been money expended to remove a cloud or for the release of a
wrongful attachment or garnishment and then only that portion which
is used for the removal of the cloud or release of the wrongful
attachment or garnishment, not the main case.
There is no evidence of any attorney fees being incurred or
any depositions being taken for the purpose of removing the cloud.
There was no conversations by the Pierces attorney with theHansens
or their attorney asking that the cloud be removed.

There is no

written demand upon plaintiff Hansens to remove the alleged cloud nor
were there any pleadings alleging a cloud or asking that it be removed.
We submit that the only thing in the Cross Complaint is allegations

i
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for damage. There was nothing in the depositions pertaining to
the removal of the cloud, it all pertained to damages.
We have Utah cases which hold that a person is entitled to
attorney fees for removing a cloud but not for attorney fees for
damages for slander of title.
In the case of Dowse v. Doris Trust Co.f 208 P.2d 956f 116 U.
106f this court holds that for the removal of the cloud an allowance
of attorney fees is proper and the court on page 957 says:
"* * * * and was compelled to commence a suit
to remove the cloud from his title and to employ
counsel to do so at a cost of $250,00i"
This clearly holds that they would be entitled to attorney fees for
removal of the cloud, but not entitled to attorney fees in a general
damage suit for slander of title.
To the same affect is the case of Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d
510.

The same doctrine applies to a suit to dissolve an attach-

ment.

The attorney fees for dissolving the attachement would be

proper damages, but not for defending the main suit.
The Court says in the case of Sproul v. Parks, 210 P.2d 436f
on page 439:
"True, the release of the mortgage by the loan
company was not executed until after the filing
of the defendants' counterclaim; but no suit had
been prosecuted by defendant to clear the title
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to the realty, nor was there any prayer for such
relief in the counter-claim. * * * that in
circumstances where collateral proceeding were
prosecuted to judgment to clear title to property
from an encumbrance, and a subsequent action for
disparagement of title were successfully maintained
there should properly be allowed as compensatory
damages in the latter suit, an amount for attorneys'
fees reasonably incurred in both actions. The
authorities will not support such an award,"
Pierces are asking for damages for the costs of coming to Salt
Lake City to take their depositions and travelling expenses when the
Pierces filed the counterclaim, they were not residents of Utah.
That they are in substance the plaintiffs in the action for damages
and

they being the plaintiffs in the action are not entitled to

their expenses of taking their depositions because it is a damage
case# and certainly they were not entitled to witness fees during
the time of the trial.
We have the statute 21-5-4 which allows the recovery of witness
fees, but the case annotated under that section specifically holds
that the Plaintiff is not entitled to a witness fee. In the case of
I.X.L, Stores Co., vs Moon, 162 P. 622, 49 U 262, at page 624, the Court
says:
"As a matter of course it is generally held that
a party to an action, although he may testify in the
case, is not to be classified as a witness within

the purview of the foregoing sectionf and is therefore
not entitled to include costs for himslef as a witness
as part of the taxable costs."

RENT
The Hansens at no time interferred with the usef access or
possession of the property and so the Pierces would not be entitled
to damages for rent. The property was entirely under the control of
the Pierces as to what was done with it.
The Pierces had no cause of action nor did they attempt a cause
of action for the possession and control of the property.

They still

had the control of the property at the time of the trial. They had a
deal to dell the property if it was not for their own actions in
not paying the taxes and allowing a judgment to be docketed against
the property, the deal would have been consummated.
Hansens did no act and there is no act claimed that prevented
the Pierces from renting the property* or use it in any manner they saw
fit.
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CONCLUSION
The Hansens relied upon Mr. Kohler, the real estate agentf to
close the deal between him and the Robinsons and executed the deeds
to Mr. and Mrs. Kohler at the request of Mr. Robinson.

Kohler was

to hold the deeds as trustee, until the deal was closed.
That in the second deal, the Howell property was to be held as
security for the payment of the Kohlers commission by Hansens or
until the property was sold.

Then the Kohlers were to make an

accounting to the Hansens. Kohlers breached this confidential
relationship and told them they would have to sue. Mr. Hansen filed
a complaint with the real estate board and the real estate board
held that Mr. Kohler should pay Hansens the sum of $4,686-00. The
Kohlers have been unjustly enriched.
The Hansens had a perfect right to sue Kohler and were so
advised by the real estate board.
That Hansens made a full disclosure to counsel and counsel
prepared the Complaint and the Lis Pendens against the Kohlers.
The Pierces were not a party to the lawsuit and their title was
in no manner questioned.
Under the Utah Statutes, the Hansens had a right to file the
Lis Pendens so if there was any interest in the property still in
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the Kohlersf that it would be subject to any Judgment that the
Hansens may recover. At no time did they do any act which cast
any cloud upon the Pierces title or ownership to the property.
The lawsuit was against the Kohlers not the Pierces and the statute
specifically gave them the right to file a Lis Pendens.
The Hansens were never asked to release the Lis Pendens or
told that it was a cloud on their title or of any difficulties
Pierces were having.
That there was no notice, no pleadings, no work done by the
attorneys, Vlahos and Gale or Knowlton, or any expenses
to remove the cloud.

incurred

The only act that was taken by Vlahos and Gale

and Knowlton was to file a cross complaint for damages. No expenses
were incurred by Pierces to remove any alleged cloud. No damages or
expenses were incurred or any act done to remove any cloud.

That

nothing was done by the Hansens which in any way interfered with the
possession of the property by the Pierces. The only expenses
incurred were the expenses incurred by the Pierces to obtain a
Judgment for damages from the Hansens.
Respectfully submitted,

GOLDEN W. BOBBINS
Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Appellants
455 East 400 South, Suite 50
Salt Lake City, Utah

